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ABSTRACT
A power describes the ability of an agent to act in some way. While
this notion of power is critical in the context of organisational dy-
namics, and has been studied by others in this light, it must be
constrained so as to be useful in any practical application. In par-
ticular, we are concerned with how power may be used by agents to
govern the imposition and management of norms, and how agents
may dynamically assign norms to other agents within a multi-agent
system. We approach the problem by defining a syntax and seman-
tics for powers governing the creation, deletion, or modification of
norms within a system, which we refer to as normative powers. We
then extend this basic model to accommodate more general pow-
ers that can modify other powers within the system, and describe
how agents playing certain roles are able to apply powers, changing
the system’s norms, and also the powers themselves. We examine
how the powers found within a system may change as the status
of norms change, and show how standard norm modification op-
erations — such as the derogation, annulment and modification of
norms — may be represented within our system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence—
multi-agent systems
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Norms, Power
1. INTRODUCTION
Norm aware agents make use of norms, such as obligations, per-
missions, and prohibitions, to represent and reason about socially
imposed goals and capabilities. Such agents are able to decide
whether to act in a manner consistent with norms, or whether to
ignore them. Norms enable the behaviour of agents (and a system
or society as a whole) to be guided or constrained without intruding
upon agent autonomy. The ability to modify norms allows a norma-
tive system to change as the environment evolves, enabling effec-
tive system operation in the face of unexpected situations (by set-
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ting up new rules of behaviour); indeed, it has been recognised that
self modification is an integral capability for a normative system
[3], and increases its robustness and usefulness [1]. It is this ability
to modify a norm (norm creation, deletion or change) through agent
actions, that we refer to as a normative power when the resultant
norm is recognised by other agents.
While a number of models have been proposed which support
norm modification to a lesser or greater extent (see for example [2,
5]), most of these models ignore the fact that an agent modifying a
norm does not have full control of the normative system; that is, it is
only capable of modifying a subset of the system’s norms, usually
in some specific way. For example, a professor within a university
has the power to impose some course related obligation or permis-
sion on their students, but may not create recognised norms dealing
with their university fees. However, it is not clear how the changes
brought about by an agent may be represented without enumerating
all possible norm modifications in advance. In order to capture this
intuition in existing models, one would have to specify all possible
norm modifications in advance. This is clearly not practical in open
domains, where new situations may arise, and new norms may ap-
pear as the system evolves. Even in closed domains, specifying all
possible norm modifications may be infeasible due to the number
of modifications that may need to be specified. In this paper, there-
fore, we focus on a mechanism for system self modification built
around the action of constituent agents.
Our contributions in this paper are threefold. First, we provide a
framework for norms in which the application of normative power
can be modelled. That is, given an initial set of norms, we identify
those norms that exist after an agent has taken some norm modifi-
cation related action. Second, we describe a method for restricting
the types of norms an agent may modify, and the ways in which
such modification can take place (thus providing control over how
the normative system may be changed). Finally, our analysis can
be applied not only to norms, but also to normative powers, and
to powers over such powers ad-infinitum, allowing us to specify
the powers that an agent may modify in the system. We term such
powers general powers, and show how our model can be used to
describe the effects of an application of a general power, and re-
strict the general powers an agent may make use of. We show the
applicability of our work by demonstrating how it may be applied
to model common situations such as when a norm must be dero-
gated, and examine how norms and powers may be dynamically
modified within an open environment.
2. NORMS
Before considering norms in detail, we introduce the motivat-
ing example of an academic environment consisting of a number of
professors, post-doctoral researchers, and students, each working
on various projects. In such a situation, professors may be obliged
to teach certain courses, while post-docs and students may need
to write papers according to the demands of the professor running
their project. Norms to describe this type of institution include
those that require professors to give lectures on certain courses,
students to write papers, and so on.
Professors may have certain powers. For example, they may be
able, but are not required, to oblige a post-doc to replace them when
giving a lecture, or may oblige a student or post-doc to write a
paper, possibly for a specific conference.
Our model of power is closely aligned with the normative model
originally proposed in [10], designed to track complex changes to
the status of norms over time, and is particularly applicable to con-
tract representation and reasoning. Below, we provide a brief out-
line of this normative model.
At the heart of the model lies the concept of a norm, which iden-
tifies an obligation or permission that comes into force in a particu-
lar situation, and which ceases to affect an agent given some other
situation. The norm’s components are represented in some logical
predicate language L. The choice of a specific predicate language
is left open as the model only requires abstract concepts that can be
specialised according to the particular system to which the norms
apply, as well as the associated languages used for representation
and reasoning. In this paper, we assume that L is first order logic.
Norms may be abstract or instantiated. Abstract norms iden-
tify the classes of situations in which obligations or permissions
may come into force or cease to be, while instantiated norms rep-
resent the particular obligations or permissions applicable to sets
of agents when the situations identified by the abstract norms oc-
cur. Abstract norms consists of five elements: a norm type (NTy)
stating whether the norm is an obligation or permission1; an acti-
vation condition NA, identifying the conditions under which it is
activated (i.e. instantiated); the class of agents (the norm’s targets,
NTa) to which the norm applies when activated; an expiration con-
dition NE, identifying the conditions under which an instantiated
norm expires (i.e. no longer has normative force); and the states
of affairs (known as the norm conditions, and labelled NC below)
that are obligatory or permitted (depending on the norm’s type).
DEFINITION 1. (Norm) A normN is a tuple of the form
〈NTy,NA,NC,NE,NTa〉
where: NTy ∈ {obligation, permission}, and NA,NC, NE,
and NTa are all wff in L 
Thus, we could have an abstract norm obliging a professor P , who
runs a course C to give a lecture at the appropriate time on the
subject, and that the lecture must take two units of time. More
specifically, if P gives course C, and the time the course starts is
Y , and it is now time Y , then, until the current time is Y + 2, the
lecturer is obliged to be giving a lecture L, with the subject of the
lecture being the course. 2:
LectureObligation : 〈obligation,
givesCourse(P,C) ∧ timeOfCourse(C, Y ) ∧
currentT ime(T1) ∧ T1 = Y,
givingLecture(P,L) ∧
subjectOfLecture(L,C),
currentT ime(T2) ∧ T2 > Y + 2,
professor(P )〉
1Prohibitions are obligations with negated normative conditions.
2Wemake use of Prolog notation within our logical formulae. Vari-
ables begin with a capital letter, and constants with lowercase.
In this case, the abstract norm to give a lecture holds whenever the
current time equals the course’s time (i.e. the norm’s NA param-
eter holds). When this occurs, the norm affects the agent (in this
case obliging it to give the lecture), and the norm is thus instanti-
ated. More generally, if, at any point, an abstract norm’sNA holds,
an instantiated version of the norm is created (subject to constraints
discussed in [10]). This instantiation involves creating a copy of the
abstract norm in which the norm’s variables are bound to the val-
ues that caused the activation condition to evaluate to true. When
instantiated, the individuals specified by NTa are identified. These
individuals are then either obliged or permitted (as determined by
NTy) to bring about the normative goal specified by NC , until the
conditions specified by NE hold.
Thus, a norm is instantiated with respect to some background
logical theory Γ describing the environment, ifNA can be inferred
from Γ, andNTa can be inferred from Γ as a ground formula (i.e,
all variables in NTa are instantiated). Given the above norm, if a
professor smith gives a course on physics, and the time of the course
is 11, (givesCourse(smith,physics) and timeOfCourse(physics,11)
are true, as well as professor(smith)), then we obtain the following
instantiated norm:
LectureObligation′ : 〈obligation,
givesCourse(smith, physics) ∧ timeOfCourse(physics, 11) ∧
currentT ime(11) ∧ 11 = 11,
givingLecture(smith, L) ∧
subjectOfLecture(L, physics),
currentT ime(T2) ∧ T2 > 13,
professor(smith)〉
It should be noted that while the entire activation condition is
ground within an instantiated norm, the normative and expiration
conditions may contain variables. These conditions evaluate to
false until some grounding is possible, from formulae obtained
from the domain, which cause the condition to evaluate to true.
Building on this base, [10] describes how certain predicates re-
lated to the status of a norm may be evaluated. In particular, a
norm’s status relates to concepts such as being instantiated, vio-
lated and expired. Its status may change over time, and the model
captures this notion by proposing a simple temporal structure from
which the status of norms may be derived at any time. Using this
structure, predicates may be created referring to a norm’s status.
For example, the predicate violated(N , t) evaluates to true if norm
N is violated at time t. These predicates may be used like any oth-
ers, and can thus be thought of as forming part of Γ. We assume
that all predicates within our system are temporal in nature, and
evaluate to true, or false, at different points in time. We thus write
Γt to represent the subset of Γ which contains all predicates true at
time t, and label the instant following it Γt+1.
3. NORMATIVE POWER
The normative model described in the previous section allows an
agent to determine what it must, may, or may not do. It also allows
an agent to determine whether some norm was or was not complied
with. However, it does not make any attempt to model how a set
of norms may be assigned to an agent, modified, or deleted, and
whether such operations should be complied with by the agent.
Thus, for example, the normative model cannot represent the
ability of a professor to create a new norm, requiring a student to
write a paper for some conference. Clearly, if such a norm was to
be created, it should be complied with by the student. However,
a norm representing another demand by the professor, for exam-
ple obliging the student to wash the professor’s car, would not be
recognised as a valid obligation by the student, who would not incur
any penalties from the institution if it chose to violate this obliga-
tion.
In this section, therefore, we consider how we may capture the
notions underlying the modification of norms in a system through
exercising power over those norms; we introduce a new model of
normative power. We begin with an informal analysis of power,
after which we detail a simple model of power, able to capture the
notion that an agent has the power to affect a single situation. We
then refine this model by describing norm templates, which identify
sets of related norms that may be affected by a single power. Note
that the examples used in the remainder of this paper are somewhat
contrived for reasons of exposition and berevity, but we believe
clarify the points we are trying to illustrate. In particular, we avoid
the notion of deadlines but have illustrated their use in Section 3.
3.1 The Notion of Power
An agent able to create, delete or modify some norms within an
institution is said to have normative power over those norms.
In their seminal work, Sergot and Jones [8] make mention of
three distinct aspects of power, namely:
1. a legal power, which is recognition by the institution that
some action will have some (institutional) effect;
2. a physical power, which is the ability of an agent to undertake
some action that will have the power’s effect; and
3. a permission to undertake the action.
In this paper, the notion of normative power adopted is a combi-
nation of the first two of these aspects. That is, an agent with nor-
mative power over some norm has the capability to alter the norm
in some way that is recognised by the appropriate institution (i.e.
the power is legal). The third aspect here is not core to our model
of power, but we do consider it further in Section 6.
3.2 A Model of Power
Suppose we have the situation in which a professor, John, wants
their student, Isaac, to write a paper for AAMAS. Given the norma-
tive model described in Section 3, we can express this norm (which
we label WP, for writing a paper) as follows.
WP : 〈obligation,
>,
writingPaper(A) ∧ target(A, aamas),
written(A),
student(isaac)〉
Here, > indicates that the norm is always applicable. In other
words, it will immediately be instantiated.
In order to capture what is required to represent John’s power
to impose the WP norm (in this case, by creating it), we need to
identify John as the agent exercising the power, and WP as the
norm being imposed. More generally, we often also want to specify
when this power can be exercised, and the particular modifications
to norms that are covered by the power. The former of these can
be represented using a condition, as in the case of the activation
and expiration conditions of norms. The latter is more interesting
in that it should permit the addition of new norms (as in our exam-
ple), the deletion of norms, and the modification of existing norms.
To represent this, we consider the norms before and after the mod-
ification.
Given our representational requirements, we need to be able to
identify the following in a model of power:
1. The agents that are able to exercise the power.
2. The situations in which the power may be applied.
3. The norms or powers that must already exist in the system,
and which are modified or removed by the exercise of the
power.
4. The norms or powers that will exist in the system after the
application of the power, in place of the norms or powers
identified by the previous point.
This provides us with the basis for an initial definition of norma-
tive power, as follows.
DEFINITION 2. (Naive Normative Power) A normative power
is a tuple
〈Mandators,Context ,Pre,Post〉
whereMandators is a set of predicates identifying agents;Context
is a logical sentence identifying the situations in which the power
may be applied; Pre and Post are sets of norms removed and in-
serted within the system by the application of the power. 
Making use of this definition gives rise to a data structure, for
our example of a professor (John) having the power to make their
student (Isaac) write a paper for AAMAS, as follows.
〈professor(john),
>,
{},
{WP}〉
Here, the first element identifies the agent(s) and roles able to
exercise the power; the second identifies the situations in which
the norm may be applied (with > stating that the power may be
applied in all situations); the third parameter lists the set of norms
that are deleted from the system during power application; and the
fourth lists those norms that appear in the system after the power
is applied. Note that we have written WP within the power for
conciseness; formally, the entireWP norm should appear in place
ofWP within the power.
Based on this pattern, norm creation then amounts to a similar
structure with an empty set of deleted norms in the third param-
eter of the power, and a set of newly created norms in its fourth
parameter. Conversely, norm deletion amounts to listing norms to
be deleted in the third parameter, and leaving the fourth empty. Fi-
nally, norm modification can take place by putting norms in both
the third and fourth parameters.
However, this approach of explicitly listing each of an agent’s
normative powers, for each relevant norm, is not practical. Return-
ing to our example, suppose that John the professor also requires
Isaac the student to write a paper for IJCAI. Here, we need an ad-
ditional power, similar to the first, with a norm WP ′ instead of
WP , using the predicate target(X, ijcai) to target the new con-
ference. Clearly, particularly in an open environment where new
conferences may appear, an exhaustive list of powers targeting var-
ious conferences is undesirable (or even impossible to generate).
Instead, we would like to be able to specify a power that allows
a professor to oblige their students to write a paper for some con-
ference, but without specifying which conference. Intuitively, if
someone has a normative power then they should be able to modify
a set of relevant norms in some way, rather than just focusing on an
individual norm.
N1 : 〈obligation,
wantsPaper(T, P ) ∧ supervisor(S, T ),
writtenPaper(S, P ),
writtenPaper(S, P ),
student(S)〉
N2 : 〈obligation,
wantsPaper(T, P ) ∧ supervisor(S, T ) ∧ target(P,C),
writtenPaper(S, P ) ∧ submitted(P,C),
writtenPaper(S, P ) ∧ submitted(P,C),
student(S)〉
Table 1: A general (N1) and more specific (N2) norm.
3.3 Norm Templates
One way to capture the intuition of modifying a set of norms
rather than just an individual norm is to specify a norm template,
with the aim of identifying the families of norms affected by the
power. In this model, if an individual norm fits the norm template
of some power P , then that normative power may affect the norm
in some way.
A norm template is thus a general form of norm suitable for iden-
tifying families of norms; it can be defined to be the same as a norm,
but with the possibility of generalising the norm type to include
both obligations and permissions, for example (thus allowing for it
to capture both permissions and obligations related to some set of
norm targets and activation, normative and expiration conditions).
DEFINITION 3. (Norm Template) A norm template is a norm
with one possible additional element in NTy, namely the truth
symbol >. 
Norm templates may be more or less general but, given the struc-
ture of norms and their conditions, clearly determining whether a
norm fits a norm template is not trivial. For example, a norm requir-
ing students to write papers as specified by their supervisor is more
general than one requiring students to write a particular paper for
a particular conference, as specified by their supervisor. These
norms can be represented asN1 andN2 in Table 1. In a sense, the
latter norm may be viewed as a special case of the former norm.
Furthermore, if some authority is able to issue the former norm,
then they should be able to issue the latter. Our procedure for de-
termining whether a norm fits a norm template is built around this
idea of norm specialisation, or norm subsumption. Therefore, we
identify a procedure for inferring whether one norm (or norm tem-
plate) subsumes some other norm (or norm template).
Given our representation of norms, one norm, N1, is more gen-
eral than another, N2, if N1’s activation condition, normative condi-
tion, and expiration condition can each be inferred from (the more
specific norm) N2’s activation, normative and expiration condition.
However, as we discuss below, some refinements to this approach
are needed in the case of the normative condition. Before dis-
cussing these refinements, we examine the activation and expira-
tion conditions more closely.
3.3.1 Activation and Expiration Conditions
Consider two norms, one with an activation condition of x, and
another with an activation condition of the form x ∧ y, for some
formulae x and y. These activation conditions can be read as stat-
ing “if x then . . . ”, and “if x and y then . . . ” respectively. Clearly,
the latter activation condition is more specific than the former, and
any power which allows the former norm should allow the latter.
In other words, specialisation of the antecedent via conjunction in-
troduction is valid. Similarly, an expiration condition containing
x∧ y means “. . . until x and y occur”, which again, is valid to infer
as a specialisation of an expiration condition of the form x. Thus,
the activation and expiration conditions of norm N2 in Table 1 are
clearly specialisations of these conditions in norm N1. Note also
that given a norm with some activation condition x, we may not
infer that some other norm with activation condition y is a special-
isation of that norm, as x and y are unrelated. Thus, a norm of the
form “if it is the weekend, you must work” is not one that should
be inferred as a specialisation (or generalisation) of a norm stating
“if it is a weekday, you must work”. Given this analysis, it is clear
that standard logical inference may be used to determine whether
some activation or expiration condition is a specialisation of some
other activation or expiration condition.
3.3.2 The Normative Condition
However, this analysis does not hold for the normative condition.
In our example, the power enabling a professor to ask a student to
write a paper and target it at the AAMAS conference (expressed in
the normative condition), is a valid application of the more general
power to require a student to write a paper. Using ` to represent
inference, we may conclude that
writingPaper(S, P )∧submitTo(P,C) ` writingPaper(S, P )
However, by using a logic that allows for conjunction elimination,
we must also admit the following inference:
writingPaper(S, P )∧stealFrom(S,U) ` writingPaper(S, P )
In other words, by using this simple analysis, the application of a
power allows for a norm condition to oblige the party affected by
the norm to achieve some state of events and any other state of
events. This is clearly both undesirable and inappropriate.
It appears that, unlike the expiration and activation conditions,
there is no way to generalise an arbitrary logical formula’s form in
a way that is consistent across different norms. However, it is clear
that many generalisations of a norm are ontological in nature, in the
sense that a normmay refer to somemore specific concepts than ex-
ist in some other, more general norm. For example, the concept of
writing a paper may be a subconcept of the more general concept
of doing academic work. A professor able to require a post-doc to
do academic work should thus also be able to require the post-doc
to write a paper. Without dwelling on the vast literature on ontolo-
gies, we capture the notion of ontological generalisation through a
simple predicate hierarchy where p1(. . .) ≤ p2(. . .) denotes that
p1 is more than, or as specific as p2, and use this in defining the no-
tion of norm subsumption, in which one norm is identified as more
general than another. We may extend this notion to logical sen-
tences; we write P ≤ Q iff for every predicate p in P , substituting
it with a predicate q such that p ≤ q, we obtain Q.
In order to capture ontological specialisation in our model, we
define a new inference operator ⇒ to include both logical infer-
ence, as well as the ontological dimension of subsumption. Thus,
A ⇒O B iff A′ ` B where A ≤ A′ with respect to some ontol-
ogy O. In what follows, we implicitly assume the existence of an
ontology, and thus write A⇒ B.
Finally, we may also want to specify that an agent may have
unlimited scope regarding some norm parameter, for example any
activation condition for the norm. We make use of the> symbol as
a wildcard to capture this notion, and reflect this in our definition
of norm subsumption.
3.3.3 Norm Subsumption
We are now in a position to define norm subsumption. One norm
template n1 subsumes another norm or norm template n2 (i.e. n1
is more general than n2) if they share a norm type, or the former’s
type is>; n1’s activation and expiration conditions may be inferred
(with respect to some ontology) from n2; and n1’s normative con-
dition and norm target are ontologically more general than n2’s.
Alternatively, if any parameter in n1 is >, that parameter in n2 is
automatically assumed to satisfy the condition for subsumption.
DEFINITION 4. (Norm Subsumption)Given a partially ordered
hierarchy of predicates, and two norm templates n1, n2 of the form
〈NTyi, NAi, NCi, NEi, NTai〉
where i ∈ {1, 2} respectively, we say that n1 subsumes n2 (i.e. n1
is more general than n2), written n1n n2 iff
1. NTy1 = > or NTy1 = NTy2
2. NA1 = > or NA2 ⇒ NA1
3. NE1 = > or NE2 ⇒ NE1
4. NC1 = > or NC2 ≤ NC1 or NC2 is a ground version of
NC1
5. NTa1 = > or NTa1 ≤ NTa2 
Thus, for example, a norm with an activation condition a is sub-
sumed by a norm with an activation condition a ∨ b, while a norm
with an activation condition a∧ b subsumes a norm with an activa-
tion condition a. Now, we may revise our earlier definition of naive
normative power, using norm templates rather than norms.
DEFINITION 5. (Normative Power) A normative power is a tu-
ple
〈Mandators,Context ,Pre,Post〉
whereMandators is a set of predicates identifying the agents able
to exercise the power; Context is a logical sentence identifying
the situations in which the power may be applied; and Pre and
Post are sets of norm templates identifying the norms removed and
inserted within the system by the application of the power. 
4. APPLYING POWERS
While we have defined the structure of a normative power, we
have not yet considered the effects of the application of the power
on the norms within an environment.
4.1 Institutional Environment
So far, we have considered norms and powers as disembodied
concepts, but they must exist somewhere. Conceptually, they may
be considered as mental components within individual agents which
themselves make up an institution. We abstract away from the indi-
vidual agents by representing norms and powers as belonging to the
institution, and assume that this institution can change over time.
For convenience, we assume a discrete time model, and thus, at
any time point t, there exists some set of norms and powers within
the institution. The application of a power at time t then alters the
norms that exist at time t + 1. Changes in the environment and
agent actions may also alter the norms over time, due to the instan-
tiation of new norms from abstract norms, and the expiration of
other instantiated norms due to agent action. We refer to the set of
norms and powers as the institutional environment.
The institutional environment may be viewed as a trace, and is
used to track the powers found within the institution at any point
in time, as well as the abstract norms imposed on the members of
the institution. The institutional environment thus stores the ab-
stract norm set ANS from which norms are instantiated within
the normative environment. We are now in a position to define the
institutional environment.
DEFINITION 6. Institutional Environment The institutional en-
vironment IE is a set of triples
〈T,ANS, Powers〉
where T ∈ Z identifies a time point, ANS is a set of abstract
norms, and Powers is a set of powers.
A norm n is said to be within an institutional environment IE at
time T iff 〈T,ANS, Powers〉 ∈ IE and n ∈ ANS.
A power p is said to be within an institutional environment IE
at time T iff 〈T,ANS, Powers〉 ∈ IE and p ∈ Powers.
The roles able to exercise a power, within the context of the insti-
tutional environment, are captured within the power’s mandator’s.
A mandator of the form professor(X) means that any agent in the
professor role is able to exercise the power.
4.2 Core Power Operations
Given this, we can define three basic operations using norma-
tive powers: the generation, deletion and modification of norms. In
what follows, we examine how the application of a power to per-
form these operations affects the institutional environment.
Generating Norms Given an institutional environment at time t
containing a power of the form
〈A,C, {}, N〉
where A is a set of agents, C is a logical formula that is true
at time t, andN is a set of norm templates where, for at least
one n ∈ N , there is no norm in the institutional environment
that is subsumed by n, the application of the power results
in an institutional environment at time t+ 1 where, for each
n ∈ N , there is a norm that is subsumed by n.
Deleting Norms Given an institutional environment at time t con-
taining a power of the form
〈A,C,N, {}〉
where A identifies a set of agents, C is a logical formula that
is true at time t, and N is a set of norm templates such that
for all n ∈ N there is a norm in the institutional environment
that is subsumed by n, application of the power results in an
institutional environment at time t+1 in which, for each n ∈
N , there is no norm that is subsumed by n. (This is clearly
a very strong operation, deleting all norms subsumed by n;
deleting just one norm may be desirable, but it is not clear
how this might be determined, and we leave consideration of
this to future work.)
Modifying Norms The modification of a norm consists of deleting
some norms in the system, and creating other norms in their
place. Thus, given an institutional environment at time t,
containing a power of the form
〈A,C,Na, Np〉
delayPower : 〈conferenceOrganizer(CO),
>,
{submitObligation},
{submitObligation, delayPermission}〉
submitObligation : 〈obligation,
dateToday(21August),
submittingPaper(P ),
paperSubmitted(P ),
agent(A)〉
delayPermission : 〈permission,
dateToday(21August),
¬submittingPaper(P ),
paperSubmitted(P ) ∨ dateToday(28August),
agent(A)〉
Table 2: An illustration of derogation.
then application of the power results in an institutional envi-
ronment at time t+ 1 in which first power 〈A,C,Na, {}〉 is
applied and then power 〈A,C, {}, Np〉 is applied.
4.3 Complex Power Operations
Norms may be modified in several different ways. Building on
the core power operations specified above, we can derive further
operations. For example, derogation is an operation sometimes
considered in the context of norms when they are not fully revoked.
In our model, we can view this as the creation of a permission to
override some obligation. For example, norm submitObligation
in Table 2 states that an agent may be obliged to submit a paper on
the 21st of August. Power delayPower states that a conference or-
ganiser may create a permission allowing submission a week later
(represented by the permission delayPermission within the Ta-
ble 2).
If, at time t0 the set of norms contains submitObligation, the
application of the power (which may be applied by the confer-
ence organiser at any time, due to the context condition >) will
result in the set of norms containing both submitObligation and
delayPermission at time t1. Thus, while the obligation to submit
a paper on the 21st of August still exists, any agent not submitting
a paper on that date will not be violating the obligation due to the
existence of the permission (where permissions are treated as ex-
ceptions to obligations). It should be noted that the permission’s
activation condition means that the power must be used before, or
on the deadline date, otherwise the permission will not come into
force.
In general, some obligation O with normative condition NCO
may be derogated by creating a permission P with normative con-
dition ¬NCO . As seen above, the pattern for such a power is of
the form 〈M,C, {O}, {O,P}〉. While the original obligation is
deleted, it is reinserted due to the power’s postconditions. Thus,
as expected the power may not be applied if the obligation does
not currently exist. The scope of the derogation may be controlled
through the permission’s activation and expiration conditions.
5. GENERAL POWER
In a manner similar to the way in which agents may create,
delete, or modify a norm, agents may also be able to create, delete
or modify powers (which may themselves be powers over norms or
over other powers). We refer to such a power as a general power.
The act of performing the operations described by a power is called
exercising or applying the power. For example, a professor may
give a post-doc the power to ask a PhD student to write a paper.
We treat general powers as an extension to normative powers,
capturing both the notion of general and normative power (and thus
replacing the latter). We define a general power as a power over a
power or over a norm.
DEFINITION 7. (General Power) A general power gp, is a tu-
ple 〈M,C, Pr, Po〉, containing M a set of predicates identifying
agents; C a logical sentence identifying the situations in which
power may be applied; and Pr and Po, which are pairs of the
form 〈GPT,NT 〉, where GPT is a set of general powers, and
NT is a set of norm templates. 
The pairs contained within Pr and Po include sets of general
powers. Each element of these sets may in turn hold further general
powers, and if left unconstrained, this may continue ad infinitum.
We therefore require that only a finite number of general powers
exist within the system, and also that a general power cannot con-
tain a reference to itself within its Pr or Po elements, no matter
how far removed. That is, if a general powerGP1 contains another
general power GP2 within the set of general powers found in its
Pr or Po elements, and this GP2 contains a general power GP3
with its Pr or Po elements, and so on until some general power
GPn (which contains no further general powers), then all general
powers GP1, . . . , GPn must be unique.
Subsumption over a general power occurs when both the powers
and norm templates within Pr and Po are subsumed. Since the
requirements described above prohibit the possibility of loops of
general power, we may define subsumption recursively as follows.
DEFINITION 8. (Subsumption over General Powers)Given two
general powers
GP1 = 〈M1, C1, P r1, Po1〉
GP2 = 〈M2, C2, P r2, Po2〉
We say that GP1 subsumes GP2, written GP1 g GP2 iff
1. M2 ⊆M1
2. C2 ⇒ C1
3. If Pr1 = 〈GPT1, NT1〉 and Pr2 = 〈GPT2, NT2〉, then
∀t1 ∈ GPT1, ∃t2 ∈ GPT2 such that t1 g t2. ∀t1 ∈
NT1, ∃t2 ∈ NT2 such that t1 n t2.
4. If Po1 = 〈GPT1, NT1〉 and Po2 = 〈GPT2, NT2〉, then
∀t1 ∈ GPT1, ∃t2 ∈ GPT2 such that t1 g t2. ∀t1 ∈
NT1, ∃t2 ∈ NT2 such that t1 n t2. 
5.1 Applying General Powers
Using a similar approach to that used in Section 4, we can show
the effects of the application of a general power on the structure of
norms within the environment.
Given a general power 〈A,C, Pr, Po〉 such that the institutional
environment contains the general power at time t and C evaluates
to true, the power is applied iff the following conditions hold.
• At time t, given Pr = 〈GPT,NT 〉, for any elements gpt ∈
GPT , there is a general power within the institutional envi-
ronment that is subsumed by gpt. For any nt ∈ NT , there is
some norm within the institutional environment that is sub-
sumed by NT .
Given Po = 〈GPT ′, NT ′〉, for any element gpt′ ∈ GPT ′,
there is no general power within the institutional environ-
ment that is subsumed by gpt′ unless it is subsumed by an
element of GPT . For any nt′ ∈ NT ′, there is no norm
within the institutional environment that is subsumed by nt′
unless it is subsumed by an element of NT .
• At time t+1, givenPr = 〈GPT,NT 〉, Po = 〈GPT ′, NT ′,
for any element gpt ∈ GPT , there is no general power
within the institutional environment that is subsumed by gpt
unless it is subsumed by an element of GPT ′. For any
nt ∈ NT , there is no norm within the institutional envi-
ronment that is subsumed by nt unless it is subsumed by an
element of NT ′.
For any element gpt′ ∈ GPT ′, there is a general power
within the institutional environment that is subsumed by gpt′.
For any norm nt′ ∈ NT ′, there is a norm within the institu-
tional environment that is subsumed by nt′.
Following [5], we can represent the application of a power by
a predicate within the environment, allowing it to be used within
norms. Thus, if
Γt ` apply(A,P )
then power P was applied by agent A at time t.
5.2 Powers over Powers
As for normative powers, we may identify a number of stereo-
typical operations over general powers, such as the creation and
deletion (annulment) of a power. In addition, a particular instan-
tiation of a power is delegation, wherein a power is transferred to
some other agent, which may possibly be able to further transfer
this power. For example, if Bob is obliged to pay Alice five dollars,
and Alice would like to oblige Bob to give the money to Charlie
instead, she must, after changing the obligation, transfer the abil-
ity to further transfer the obligation to Charlie as well (as Charlie
could, for example, ask Bob to pay Doris the money instead). At
this point, two possible interpretations of the situation are possible.
First, it could be the case that once the obligation is transferred,
Alice may no longer affect it. She could thus not later ask for the
money to be paid to herself rather than Charlie again. Thus, the
transfer of power means that Alice loses all power over the obli-
gation. The second interpretation allows her to transfer the power
back to herself, meaning that Charlie does not have as much power
over the obligation as Alice, who can continue affecting it, even
after the application of the power.
5.2.1 Infinite Power Sequences
In the first case, it would appear that Alice must not only transfer
the obligation, and the power over the obligation, but also the power
over the power over the obligation, and so on ad infinitum. Since
we assume only a finite number of powers, such infinite power
sequences appear to be a weakness. However, since a norm (or
power) must exist within the system in order for a power affecting
it to be applied, such infinite power sequences do not actually arise
in practise. For example, we may write the norm above as
Nalice = 〈obligation, true, pay(alice, 5),
paid(alice, 5), agent(bob)〉
where the subscript identifies the target of the norm. By associating
a power of the form
PX = 〈agent(X), C, 〈{}, NX〉, 〈{}, NY 〉〉
with every agent in the system (where X and Y represent wild-
cards able to refer to every agent name, and thus Nalice represents
the norm defined above), the ability to transfer a norm without re-
sorting to infinite power sequences is provided. Using the example
of Alice and Charlie, Alice would have to apply the power Palice,
substituting Charlie for Y .
In order to represent the second situation, a modification of the
PX power is required: an agent may only transfer a norm if they
had transferred it before.
P ′X = 〈agent(X), apply(X,P ′X), 〈{}, NY 〉, 〈{}, NZ〉〉
Clearly, some bootstrapping mechanism is needed before this power
can be applied. This can take the form of another power, allowing
the original target of a norm to transfer the power. However, deter-
mining a norm’s target requires examining a norm’s historic state,
and is outside the scope of this paper.
5.2.2 Permission to Apply Powers
As mentioned in Section 3.2, Jones and Sergot [8] identified
three distinct aspects of power. It is clear that our notion of norma-
tive and general power capture the first two of these aspects, namely
the legal aspect, which states that recognition of the application of
the power will have some institutional effect, and the physical as-
pect, capturing the agent’s ability to make use of the power. The
third aspect involves the permission to make use of the power, and
is not captured by normative and general powers. It is easy to imag-
ine a situation where an agent could apply a normative power in
such a way that it is recognised by the relevant institution, but do
so in a way that it is not permitted to act. For example, a professor
could contravene university regulations and oblige a university to
grant a failing student permission to enter the next year of study.
In order to capture the third aspect of power, we must return to the
normative model, and create a permission for an agent to exercise
some power. In order to do so, we use the apply(A,P ) predicate
within the normative context of a permission (or an obligation, or
a prohibition as a negated obligation) to show that an agent may
(or must, or may not) make use of the power under some circum-
stances. Similarly, the application of a power may have normative
side effects, and the use of the apply(. . . ) predicate within a norm’s
activation condition may be used to impose these side effects on an
agent.
6. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we presented a model of power which is able to di-
rectly affect norms and other powers. An alternative interpretation
of our model could be imagined, where the application of a power
makes some certain institutional fact true [8], and the presence of
these institutional facts affects which norms are in force, and which
additional institutional facts may then be asserted. However, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3, identifying whether a power can or cannot be
applied requires non-standard inference to be performed, requiring
a new logic to be defined.
Other researchers have examined issues relating to norm modifi-
cation and normative power. In [5], Gelati et al. describe declara-
tive power, as “the capacity of a power holder to create normative
positions . . . by proclaiming such positions”. They provide a logi-
cal semantics for declarative power, and link it to standard action
logics. However, they point out that their model cannot easily rep-
resent limitations on power, or how a system in which declarative
power exists may change over time. Similarly, work such as [4] ex-
amines only an instant of time, and thus cannot model the evolution
of a normative system under the influence of power.
Building on the notion of a proclamation, [6] and [7], Gover-
natori investigates modifications of a normative system using tem-
poral extensions to defeasible logic. This work is based on the
idea of a norm modification function, which takes in a norm valid
at some time, and returns another norm together with the time at
which it is valid. The act of norm modification then makes use of
this function, replacing the norm passed into the function with the
function’s output. Governatori identifies four specific norm modifi-
cations, namely annulment, partial and total substitution, and dero-
gation, and shows how these may be represented as predicates. In
our framework, annulment corresponds to the deletion of a norm,
while partial and total substitutions are equivalent to our normmod-
ifications. Derogation can be modelled in our framework through
the introduction of a new permission, while Governatori’s work fo-
cuses on proof procedures, allowing an agent to determine the rules
and literals that may be derived given an initial set of rules and
facts. Here, proclamations serve as inputs to certain pre-created
rules, but Governatori does not discuss the structure, nor examine
how limits to an agent’s power may be defined.
In [2], Boella et al. provide an in depth examination of different
types of permissions. They show that using permissions, it is possi-
ble to limit the changes that a lower level authority can perform on
a normative system. In order to limit the permissions an authority
can provide to another agent, they introduce the notion of a com-
petence; an agent may only issue a permission to another agent if
the permission falls under the issuer’s competence. Their norms
are represented as I/O logic [9] (antecedent, consequent) pairs,
and this notion of competence is defined only on the consequent
of a norm, meaning that while it is possible to model some types
of restrictions on an agent’s powers, restrictions based on a norm’s
antecedents cannot be represented.
One issue we have not yet examined is how simultaneous modi-
fications of norms or powers should be handled. Since any applica-
tion of power deletes the original norm or power from the system
before creating a new version at the next point in time, simultane-
ous actions will cause both operations to take place. However, this
may be undesirable in some situations (for example if an agent were
to delete a power while another were to modify it, some would ar-
gue that the modification should fail). In this case, the addition of a
priority relation between powers would allow powers to be applied
in some given order, preventing these counter-intuitive results.
Finally, it should be noted that the framework of Oren et al. [10]
was used due to its underlying similarities with our model of power.
However, we believe that the work presented here can be adapted
to represent the notion of power in other normative models.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we introduced the notions of normative and general
powers. Normative powers express the fact that one or more agents
have the ability to add, delete, or modify a norm, possibly under
some specific situation. General powers represent the ability of an
agent to add, delete, or modify a normative or other general power
(in some specific situation). We showed how an agent’s application
of a power alters a set of norms and powers, and showed how an
agent’s powers may be restricted.
The concept of a power is distinct, but related to, other normative
concepts such as obligations and permissions. By introducing nor-
mative power into a multi-agent system, agents may dynamically
create new norms, allowing for increasingly complex interactions
to take place, while still placing bounds on system behaviour. This
increased richness results in more flexible norm-aware agents, and
allows for the modelling of more complex domains.
One issue that we have not yet examined is the concept of system
specification. For example, what constraints on powers are required
so as to guarantee that no conflicting norms will ever appear in a
system? Similarly, is there a way to identify the simplest set of
norms and powers required so as to guarantee that some desirable
behaviour is achieved? Such questions are common in multi-agent
systems research, and are usually answered by creating a logic to
represent the framework. In future work we will investigate how
our framework may be extended to answer these questions.
The distinction between normative power and simply giving or-
ders is both subtle and controversial, which we will explore further.
Additionally, we intend to extend our power model to allow for a
finer grained representation of normative power, focusing on the
limitations of our approach in specifying normative conditions. We
also intend to extend our normative framework so as to be able to
represent concepts such as a norm’s creditor directly.
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